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Public Housing Redevelopment as a Tool for Revitalizing Neighborhoods:
How and Why Did it Happen and What Have We Learned? 1
Mindy Turbov
Introduction
In cities across the country, distressed public housing sites are being transformed into
healthy neighborhoods attracting significant public and private investment. Historically, these
public housing neighborhoods, and their environs, presented the most difficult urban
revitalization challenges. This paper traces the history, intent and process of rethinking public
housing that have led to public housing shifting from a negative force in communities to a
positive one. In addition, it identifies five principles that are critical for public housing
revitalization to serve as a catalyst for neighborhood revitalization. This paper is informed by
over twenty-five years of working in the field of housing and neighborhood revitalization in
various positions in the public, private and non-profit sectors. In particular, during the Clinton
administration, at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), I was given the
primary responsibility for creating the HOPE VI mixed-finance program. It is that mixedfinance program that radically changed the public housing development process and led to public
housing becoming a tool for neighborhood rebuilding. In my current professional incarnation I
am co-developer of HOPE VI redevelopments and serve as a consultant on others. Also, I
recently co-authored a major study for the Metropolitan Policy Program of the Brookings
Institution on the revitalization impacts of public housing redevelopments in Atlanta, Louisville,
Pittsburgh and St. Louis. 2

1

This paper was prepared for the conference Gautreaux At Forty: Race, Class, Housing Mobility, And
Neighborhood Revitalization sponsored by Northwestern University.
2

VALERIE PIPER & MINDY TURBOV, BROOKINGS INST., HOPE VI AND MIXED FINANCE REDEVELOPMENT: A
CATALYST FOR NEIGHBORHOOD RENEWAL (2005).
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History
In 1966, Alexander Polikoff filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of Chicago Housing
Authority (CHA) resident Dorothy Gautreaux, and other CHA residents and applicants.
Gautreaux became a landmark public housing desegregation case known by housing experts and
policy makers across the country. One of the provisions of the Gautreaux consent decree created
a successful mobility program operated by the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open
Communities, as a result, “Gautreaux” has become synonymous with mobility for public housing
families. The Leadership Council program helped public housing residents relocate from CHA
developments to “opportunity areas” 3 using Section 8 rental assistance. Another remedy for
CHA’s practice of racial segregation required it to build new public housing in opportunity areas.
Both provisions were intended to enable low-income African Americans to live in economically
and racially integrated neighborhoods where life opportunities were presumed to be better than
in minority-concentrated public housing.
In the years following the filing of Gautreaux, public housing in Chicago, and in other
large cities across the nation, became increasingly economically segregated, leaving largely lowincome African American families in tightly contained pockets of concentrated poverty. With
the passage of time, public housing in large urban areas continued to deteriorate and was
consistently underfunded by HUD. As a result of various laws and policies, many working
families left public housing. At the same time, fair housing laws and changing societal norms
provided African Americans families with the opportunity to move to less segregated
communities. Fueled by these changes, as well as the riots of the late 1960s, once vibrant

3

Opportunity Areas are communities with low concentrations of poverty and minority populations.
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neighborhoods that surrounded public housing were left to the ravages of urban decline so
rampant in 1970s and 1980s.
Recognizing the increasing economic segregation and isolation of public housing
families, in 1995 the Gautreaux plaintiffs argued that economic segregation should also be a
consideration in the placement of public housing. This was a watershed moment for
desegregation cases – substituting economic integration for racial integration as a permissible
relief. It was hoped that economic integration might be the first step to racial integration. 4
At the same time Gautreaux was moving to economic integration as a remedy for
segregation, HUD was questioning many of its policies that encouraged concentrated poverty in
public housing. In particular, the HOPE VI program, providing as much as $50 million dollars
for the redevelopment of public housing developments, was continuing to foster developments
that would isolate residents in concentrated poverty. Under the leadership of Henry Cisneros and
his team, HUD began to radically rethink its approach to public housing redevelopment. Using
the resources of the HOPE VI program, HUD embarked on a controversial new approach to
redeveloping public housing as economically integrated developments that ideally would also
spark revitalization in the surrounding neighborhoods.
Ten years ago, the idea of having a conference on public housing and neighborhood
revitalization would have seemed impossible. For decades, public housing was isolated from its
larger neighborhood, often viewed with hostility by the community and generally a visible cause
for neighborhood decline. In most large cities, the disinvestment and decline surrounding public
housing developments, or “projects,” was dramatic. Vacant lots, abandoned houses and
shuttered stores on weak commercial streets were the neighborhood norm. Public housing

4

Conversation with Alexander Polikoff (Jan. 2006).
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developments, often poorly managed, became home to gangs, drug dealing and other criminal
activity. City government had little or nothing to do with public housing. Institutional structures
and programmatic barriers encouraged city government to shy away from public housing –
primarily because the problems seemed too intractable to solve. Most mayors saw no political
upside and a significant political downside to getting involved in the issue.
Yet today, we can point to some of the largest successes in neighborhood revitalization in
decades as being driven by public housing. Mixed-income communities are being created across
the country that include long-term affordable housing (i.e. public housing) built at a
neighborhood scale. The residents of this housing have the benefit of quality neighborhood
amenities and services that are emerging as the old developments are demolished and new
communities are built. Much of the rental housing is subject to market forces, meaning that
people with other housing options choose to live there. These market-rate renters demand
quality property management, amenities and services, all of which flows to the benefit of the
public housing families. Public housing, once an anathema to neighborhood revitalization, is
now one of the greatest generators of urban reinvestment. How did this happen?
In 1994, while working at HUD as an appointee in the Clinton administration, I was
asked by then Chief of Staff Bruce Katz to move to the department of Public and Indian Housing
to lead an effort to radically change the HOPE VI program. It had become quite clear to HUD
leadership that most public housing authorities (“PHAs”) were unable to strategically use the up
to $50 million HOPE VI grants. Those that were able to develop plans were essentially planning
on major rehabilitation with some level of PHA operated social services. The rehabilitation costs
were exorbitant. The units and the developments would still look like public housing, act like
public housing and just be slightly better looking. PHAs were getting little cooperation from
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their city governments with respect to additional funding. Many PHAs were mired in
controversy with their residents. The program was stalled in many locations. The funds were
not being drawn from HUD, leaving the program vulnerable to Congressional scrutiny, or worse,
rescission of funding. At the same time, a few enlightened housing authority directors, a small
group of affordable housing developers and some newly elected mayors where questioning the
rationale for continuing to reinforce concentrated poverty. Why, they asked, was HUD
continuing to pour good money after bad in obsolete buildings and developments? The failings
of public housing and welfare programs, in general, were clearly understood as they affected
families and neighborhoods. Why was the federal government reinforcing failed policy? These
mayors, PHA directors and experienced mixed-income housing developers proposed a way to
economically integrate public housing using HOPE VI funds and/or other public housing capital
dollars. The idea was to use public housing funds to leverage additional public and private
capital, and then employ those greater resources to break up the large public housing sites and
build new mixed income developments that fit into the fabric of the neighborhood. The hope
was that the public housing families would benefit from economic integration and the larger
neighborhoods could be revitalized in the process.
Innovation is not the hallmark of most public bureaucracies, let alone one that had only a
few years before been labeled by the “HUD Scandals.” 5 When I got to the Public and Indian
Housing Department at HUD, I was shocked at how the system worked. After more than fifteen
years in the field of affordable housing and neighborhood revitalization, I could not comprehend
how insular the system had become. Years of rules, regulations and statutes created a system
that encouraged PHAs and their residents to behave in ways not accepted by the society at large.
5

The HUD Scandals were the corruption uncovered at HUD in the 1980s that led to a number of political appointees
going to jail, as well as significant scrutiny of the agency.
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Some of my colleagues, within HUD and some of the reformers within PHA, described the
system as a parallel universe.
The goals, incentives, rules, regulations and subsequent motivations of the PHA and the
people it housed were generally foreign to how others in our society are treated and consequently
behave. The operations of public housing in no way mirrored how private real estate operates.
The single largest affordable housing program in our country had failed in large cites. It failed
its residents, its neighborhoods and their cities. Success for PHAs was defined by not having
audit findings or inspector general investigations, and by attaining sufficiently high enough
ratings in HUD’s evaluation system to keep the PHA off the “troubled list.” 6 While this rating
system may have satisfied HUD, it did not necessarily improve the living conditions for residents
or improve the surrounding neighborhoods. As one public housing official stated to me: "When
I got to the agency we had a score of twenty-seven, within a few years we had a score in the
nineties, but we looked around and the housing was still terrible. The residents were still isolated
and the surrounding neighborhoods were still suffering.” 7 The system rewarded the status quo,
however peculiar and, more importantly, it punished innovation.
Success for residents was generally defined as getting out of public housing. Success for
residents, as defined by HUD, was increased employment and income. For residents, higher
incomes meant paying more rent to live in the same apartment with no increase in the quality of
services available to them and where some of their neighbors were paying little or no rent for the
same apartments. The system created a disincentive for work and upward mobility. Families
living in public housing that wanted vouchers to live in private housing were thwarted. They
6

“Troubled” housing authorities were subject to greater HUD scrutiny. Many big city housing authorities were on
the troubled list.

7

Conversations with Christopher Shea, Assistant Commissioner Baltimore Housing. Former Director, Special
Projects and Planning, Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh.
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were barred access to the voucher program. They were trapped in the development in which
they lived and, on rare occasions, were given the opportunity to move to another.

Isolated from the mainstream
Public housing authorities are chartered by states, separate from cities in which they
operate, with little direct accountability to the public. Their policies and operations are governed
by boards that are appointed by a variety of local officials (dependent upon state statute) at least
one step removed from accountability under the local electoral process. Detailed laws and
regulations govern almost every aspect of operations, from tenant selection, occupancy and
capital improvements to demolition, disposition and new development. The functioning of this
system has little or nothing to do with the normal functioning of real estate in a market context.
Yet most PHAs are the largest landlords in a city or a region.
As a result of the way the system evolved, public housing generally operated in isolation.
It had become a smaller city within a city, with its own “city council” of resident leaders elected
pursuant to federal regulations. In the public housing city many of the institutions that are found
in neighborhoods such as schools, parks and recreation centers were located right on-site
requiring little interaction with the larger neighborhood. Public housing resident groups
historically have not had reasons to work with nearby community and civic organizations. Nor
have surrounding communities viewed their public housing neighbors as part of the
neighborhood. In fact, public housing developments and their residents were often viewed with
distrust and disdain. At the operating level, public housing officials had little need to work with
their counterparts in local government. And, little was to be gained by city officials engaging in
the public housing issue. Over decades, the energy of public housing communities focused
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inward, mirroring its basic architecture, thus leaving the PHA, its developments and residents
isolated from the broader community.

Welcome to the parallel universe
The parallel universe is a system where incentives, rewards and behaviors run counter to the way
the real world operates.
•

The parallel universe identifies families by the type of housing in which they live. They
are “public housing residents,” not residents of a particular neighborhood or citizens of a
particular city.

•

The parallel universe isolates families who live in public housing and the bureaucracies
that attempt to serve them from the mainstream of the communities in which they live
and operate. They are often viewed hostilely by the larger community.

•

The parallel universe anticipates that families receiving public housing assistance will lie
about income, family members or family size, and responds by imposing an intricate
system of rules and regulations on thousands of people to catch them in those lies. Yet,
nearly every homeowner who takes the home mortgage deduction on their income tax
gets a much larger annual housing subsidy and is in no way subject to this level of
scrutiny.

•

In the parallel universe, public housing authorities receive operating subsidies, i.e. rent
from HUD, whether or not a unit was vacant. What incentive is there for customer
service if the rent is paid whether or not someone lives there? What incentive is there for
maintenance and quick re-leasing of apartments?
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In the parallel universe housing authorities are given an operating subsidy based on a
formula created decades ago that has nothing to do with the actual operating costs of the
housing.

•

In the parallel universe the landlord, the PHA, is expected to be a provider of social
supports to some of the most fragile households in our society. What other landlord is
expected to solve the social problems of their residents?

•

In the parallel universe many PHAs had to create their own police forces because the
city’s police force would not or could not enforce the law, thus signaling that these
families did not deserve the full benefits of citizenship of their cities.

•

In the parallel universe schools, parks and many social service needs are provided on site.
In this contained environment there is little, if any, need to engage with the broader
society.

•

In the parallel universe there is a “parasitic infrastructure” where the weak are preyed
upon by criminal elements and others who benefit from their isolation and weakness. 8

•

In the parallel universe the largest landlord in the city (and often the region) is completely
insulated from market forces, yet its activities have major impacts on neighborhood
housing markets.

•

In the parallel universe failure is rewarded and success is not. The worst PHAs were
rewarded with the ability to apply for tens of millions of dollars of HOPE VI funds, while
high performing PHAs could not. People who work and improve their incomes must pay
more rent, while people that do not work suffer no consequences.

8

Egbert Perry, President and CEO, The Integral Group, Lecture in a class at the University of Pennsylvania (Feb.
22, 2006). Integral Group is the developer of Centennial Place in Atlanta and a number of public housing
redevelopments.
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Within this context of misguided incentives, isolation and decades of behavior at the
bureaucratic and household levels that runs counter to normal operations of society (yet was
created by our society), my colleagues and I set about transforming public housing. Our goal
was to break the isolation of the housing authorities and their residents, create quality sustainable
affordable housing and weave back the fabric of urban neighborhoods that had seriously declined
as a result of their proximity to public housing.
In a rational world, who would propose one of the largest neighborhood revitalization
programs in the history of urban programs by providing PHAs, arguably some of the weakest
public bureaucracies, with grants of up to $50 million? On the face of it, it is absurd. However,
then Secretary Henry Cisneros and others at HUD saw the HOPE VI program as an opportunity
to right the wrongs of past policies and create quality sustainable neighborhoods with long-term
affordable housing.

Historic context of HOPE VI
Fearing that the Republican administration would eliminate public housing and frustrated
with the failure and the financial and human costs of public housing, Congress established the
National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in 1989. This blue ribbon
commission was a bi-partisan group drawn from various professions and regions of the country.
The Commission developed a National Action Plan it knew would “not be easy or painless or
cheap to implement” 9 that called for a ten-year strategy to eliminate severely distressed public
housing by the year 2000.
9

NAT’L COMM’N ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUB. HOUS., Transmittal
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 1 (1992).
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The Commission not only concerned itself with the physical housing stock, but also with
the hopelessness and wasted human potential of the residents living in severely distressed public
housing. Among its most basic, yet telling, findings were:
•

Residents afraid to move about in their own homes and communities because of the high
incidence of crime

•

High unemployment and limited opportunities for meaningful employment

•

Programs designed to address distressed conditions with too little too late

•

Programs to assist residents that provide disincentives to self-sufficiency

•

Families living in physical conditions that have deteriorated to a degree that renders the
housing dangerous to the health and safety of resident. 10

The Commission called for new funding to address severely distressed public housing. The
Commission also made a series of recommendations regarding the needs of residents. Among
the Commission’s most interesting recommendation was one encouraging housing authorities to
create collaborations with private and non-profit developers and leveraging additional resources,
declaring, “Working partnerships are essential in eliminating severely distressed public housing.
Together, public housing residents; Federal, State and local governments; housing authorities;
and other public and private community based organizations can change the landscape of
severely distressed public housing developments. Separately, at best, each group can only make
such housing more palatable.” 11

10

NAT’L COMM’N ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUB. HOUS., FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE SECRETARY OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT xii-xiv (1992).
11

Id. at xiv.
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In 1992, acting on the recommendations of the Commission, Congress created the Urban
Revitalization Demonstration program, later renamed HOPE VI. The program was created
through the Appropriations Committee, thus, outside the 1937 Housing Act and its many
amendments. This meant no preexisting public housing rules or regulations applied to the HOPE
VI program. As a demonstration program, it was intended to be flexible and experimental, and
to provide housing authorities with enough funding to comprehensively address an entire
development, both physically and socially.
By 1994, nearly one billion dollars of HOPE VI grants had been awarded. We were
concerned the program was pouring good money after bad. We were concerned the program
would not meet the challenges set out by the National Commission. We also wanted to ensure
that after twelve years of Republican administrations marginalizing affordable housing and
cities, we were going to have a HUD that could add value to cities across the country.

Rethinking public housing
The first step in re-evaluating HOPE VI and how we could transform it into a
neighborhood rebuilding program was to rethink public housing. What is public housing? By its
most simplistic definition, public housing is real estate. And, by definition, public housing
authorities are publicly owned and managed real estate companies with the public purpose of
providing housing for low-income families. Public housing authorities’ most basic mission,
implicit in their relationship to the 1937 Housing Act, is “to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary
housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent safe and sanitary dwellings for families of
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low-income.” 12 Since its inception in 1937, public housing has taken on various other missions,
such as slum clearance, economic stimulus and housing of last resort, to name a few.
Public housing authorities operate real estate and rental assistance programs. HUD
provides public housing authorities with three programmatic sources of funding: operating
subsidies, capital dollars (i.e. HOPE VI funds, development funds or other modernization funds)
and Section 8 rental vouchers. In the past, a fourth stream of social service funding was
available. Essentially, rethinking public housing meant removing the programmatic lens on
these funds and viewing them simply as streams of income designed to accomplish certain goals.
At its most basic level, how does public housing work? The public housing development
concept is a simple one: use up-front capital to build housing that is debt free. This requires
rental income to cover only maintenance and management expenses and no debt service. This is
the most appealing financing available in the affordable housing arena.
What are public housing sites? They are “projects” – not apartment buildings. The term
“projects” sends a strong message. Projects house some of the lowest income families in our
cities in concentrated poverty. If new developments were created for people of varying income
ranges, they would not be “projects” and people who live in them would no longer be “public
housing tenants” or “those kids that live in the projects.”
Who uses the institution of public housing? The lowest income families in our cities live
in public housing. Yet, when they live in public housing, as opposed to the private market using
Section 8 vouchers, they are “public housing families.” Unfortunately, those words conjure up a
different image of families than the words “affordable housing renters.” If the new
developments did not distinguish housing by how it was financed (public housing, tax credit or

12

United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982)).
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market), those that lived in the development would simply be residents. They would not be
marked as public housing residents.

What did we know?
After twelve years of diminishing housing programs under Republican presidents, the
largest public housing revitalization program in decades was showing signs of stalling. Some
mayors, public housing authority directors and developers wanted to rebuild their public housing,
but not in way that would reconcentrate poverty. 13 That was the only option at the time. In
1994, Richard Baron, an experienced affordable housing developer, presented a proposal to
Secretary Cisneros that suggested using HOPE VI funds as debt. This model was based on
HUD’s highly successful Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) 14 program of the late
1970s and early 1980s. As debt, the public housing funds could leverage equity raised through
the sale of Low Income Housing Tax Credit and other forms of private debt to create
economically integrated housing. 15
If we did not figure out how to reformulate this program, there might never again be a
chance for public housing in the country. We knew:
•

HOPE VI was a flexible demonstration program with enough funding to address largescale distressed public housing sites. It had no regulations. This was a blessing and a
curse. We could experiment, but given HUD’s recent history of scandal, HUD staff and
PHA staff were understandably reticent to do anything that was controversial.

13

Mayor Freeman Bosley of St. Louis, Mayor Tom Murphy of Pittsburgh and Atlanta Housing Authority CEO
Renee Glover, all new to their positions, let HUD know they wanted to create economic integration.
14

The UDAG program provided cities with large project specific grants that they used as gap financing to major
redevelopment projects. This program fostered the creation of many public private partnerships.
15

Richard Baron had initially been asked by the Mayor of St. Louis to develop a strategy to economically integrate a
large distressed public housing site that was scheduled to be rebuilt as entirely public housing.
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PHAs, through no fault of their own, were not experienced urban redevelopers and did
not have the staff or sophistication to undertake large-scale urban redevelopment. It
simply was no longer their business. It had been decades since there was funding
available for new development. That function within the PHA system had long since
ceased to operate. New techniques of housing finance had evolved over the past decade.
The development process would have to somehow be injected with private sector
expertise and discipline. Public housing authorities would have to move out of their
comfort zones of isolation and work with new partners and stakeholders.

•

Rehabbing public housing developments, while creating better quality housing for
residents, would not break up the concentrations of poverty or have an impact on the
surrounding neighborhoods. Some mayors and housing authorities were objecting to
investing tens of millions of dollars only to continue to concentrate poverty.

•

Leveraging private dollars into the equation would provide a larger community benefit by
fostering public/private partnerships and new stakeholders in the redevelopment process.
Beginning in 1978, the UDAG program had shown that HUD could stimulate
public/private partnerships to address difficult urban problems. Why not now?
“Public/private” should be consistent.

•

There was a cadre of experienced affordable housing developers providing quality
affordable housing with tools not available to public housing authorities. Why couldn’t
the public housing streams of income be combined with other forms of debt and equity?
“Them” appears to refer to the developers not the tools.
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In order to build new developments, the old ones would have to be demolished. This
flew in the face of the statutory “one-for-one” replacement rule. 16 That law would have
to be changed.

•

Relocation would be complicated and required a significant commitment of Section 8
vouchers for relocation and permanent housing. Residents of public housing would have
the option to use Section 8 vouchers and move where they chose.

•

Every part of HUD would be affected. We needed to create an inter-departmental
working group to create and implement the new strategy. In the end, every operating
division of HUD had to waive regulations to allow mixed-finance public housing.

Mixed-finance, Mixed-income public housing
The premise of mixed-finance public housing was relatively straightforward. Design new
mechanisms that would create quality economically integrated communities using public housing
funds to leverage additional public and private funds in partnership with experienced housing
developers. The goals were to:
•

Integrate public housing into larger affordable and market-rate rental housing
developments. Use the HOPE VI dollars as no interest debt to cover the cost of
construction of the public housing units and use the operating subsidy to cover their
operations.

•

Reconfigure the public housing sites to fit back into the neighborhoods, eliminating super
blocks and re-instituting the city street patterns.

•

Break up the concentrated poverty that existed at the public housing sites.

16

The one for one replacement rule required that before a public housing unit could be demolished a replacement
unit had to be built or acquired.
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Engage a broader set of stakeholders, specifically the city government and the
surrounding neighborhood.

•

Use HOPE VI as a neighborhood rebuilding program with long-term affordable housing.

•

Use contemporary financing mechanisms to leverage new resources into inner city
neighborhoods.

•

Free public housing residents to have housing choices.

•

Provide existing public housing residents with support systems to enable them to relocate
and move back to the new site.

•

Destigmatize public housing.

•

Encourage new collaborations to create a more comprehensive social support system
helping families reach self-sufficiency.

Challenges
A major barrier to our approach, however, was that in order to use Low Income Housing Tax
Credits (the primary source of affordable housing capital), the public housing units were required
by program rules to be owned by a private taxpaying entity - not by the PHA. Ownership by an
entity other than a housing authority was not a situation ever contemplated in any public housing
regulations, rules, or procedures. In 1994, HUD’s General Counsel ruled that public housing
units could be privately owned, if they continued to be operated as public housing and remained
subject to all of the accompanying public housing operating rules and regulations. This
unorthodox ownership structure opened the door for mixed finance public housing and
collaborations between private developers and PHAs authorities. It also radically changed the
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role of PHAs from producers, managers and owners of low-income housing to that of lenders,
partners and regulators.
Another challenge to creating new communities, as opposed to rehabbing the old ones,
was the “one-for-one” replacement rule, instituted by Congress, not long after the St. Louis
Housing Authority demolished the infamous Pruitt Igoe development. “One-for-one” required
that prior to the demolition of any public housing unit, a new replacement unit would have to be
built or acquired. With limited land available in major cities and site and neighborhood
standards that did not allow for public housing to be built in largely minority or low-income
neighborhoods, there was no reasonable way to tear down obsolete public housing and rebuild it
on-site. In order to tear down public housing, new units had to be built. Yet in nearly all cases,
the only land available to rebuild public housing was on the existing site that needed to be torn
down. With this logic, HOPE VI was destined to be a major rehabilitation program of obsolete
public housing. As part of a series of public housing reform packages, the “one-for-one rule”
was eliminated, clearing the way for new development on existing public housing sites.
Finally, a mechanism had to be created that would enable public housing authorities to
solicit development partners and enter into new arrangements with private developers. In
response, the mixed-finance development rule was created. In 1995, the new strategy for
creating mixed-finance, mixed-income public housing was unveiled. It encouraged housing
authorities to test the mixed-finance concept. A document outlining goals for the mixed-finance
public housing program was sent to all eligible 1995 HOPE VI applicants. It stated:
The Department intends to utilize FY1995 HOPE VI
implementation funds to support the dramatic transformation of
severely distressed public housing rewarding strategies that
directly attack the isolation of public housing developments and
residents, by blending public housing units into economically
integrated communities. The Department encourages PHAs to
184

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

VOL. 1, NO. 1

work in partnership with organizations in the broader community
to plan viable communities that will appeal to both subsidized and
unsubsidized renters and homeowners in a competitive
marketplace.
PHAs submitting proposals for FY 1995 HOPE VI funding should
strive to achieve the following goals:
• Create communities of choice.
• Leverage additional public and private sources of capital.
• Establish collaborations.
• Establish innovative partnerships and approaches to
owning and managing public housing.
• Establish innovative approaches to funding and delivery
of supportive services.
• Establish community service programs. 17

Selection factors for the 1995 HOPE VI round reflected a sense that placing HOPE VI
redevelopments within more comprehensive community planning processes, forming new
relationships and using innovative collaborations and transaction structures could:
•

Significantly increase the resources available for both development and community and
supportive services.

•

Break down the physical and psychological divisions in communities keeping public
housing residents and others apart.

•

Maximize neighborhood revitalization benefits for both public housing residents and the
larger communities affected by the new development.

17

DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., FURTHER INFORMATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSALS FOR FY 1995
HOPE VI IMPLEMENTATION GRANTS 6-7 (1995).
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The selection process also emphasized “readiness to go,” including the degree of support and
actual commitment by outside stakeholders including city agencies, public housing residents,
surrounding community organizations, and others. 18

Preliminary Results
Among the first cities to take advantage of the mixed-finance approach were Atlanta, St.
Louis, Louisville and Pittsburgh. In each of these cities, the public housing is seamlessly
integrated into a larger development that includes affordable and market-rate housing. The
public housing funds leveraged more than double their value in new investment in
neighborhoods that had experienced almost no investment in decades. In these cities, public
housing redevelopment has spawned significant revitalization activity in the surrounding
neighborhood. 19
Redevelopments in these four cities were the subject of a paper sponsored by the
Metropolitan Policy Program of the Brookings Institution. 20 They were selected because they
were the earliest mixed finance developments funded and subsequently have the longest
operating history of any mixed finance developments. In addition, these developments have
clearly visible revitalization impacts on the surrounding communities. Also, each of the
development collaborations had clearly articulated the desire to use the public housing as a
vehicle to transform the larger neighborhood. Briefly, some of the findings were: 21

18

Id.

19

See TURBOV & PIPER, supra note 2.

20

See generally id.

21

Id. at 22-42.
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Median household income increased between 1990-2000 in each of the neighborhoods,
ranging from 23% to 193%.

•

Median household income increases significantly outstripped those of the cities and
regions.

•

Labor force participation increased between 1990-2000 in all cases, in one case from
36% to 69%.

•

Unemployment rates dropped between 1990-2000 in all cases, in one case from 35% to
7%.

•

Crime rates dropped in the three cases for which data was available. Most significant:
o In the Centennial Place neighborhood in Atlanta, one of the highest crime rate
areas of the city, serious crime dropped by 93% between 1993 to 2003.
o In the Park DuValle neighborhood in Louisville, known as the most dangerous
neighborhood in Kentucky, the overall crime rate before the redevelopment and
after the redevelopment dropped by 82%.

•

In all cases there was a revival of a private housing market. This took the form of:
o Increased housing values in the neighborhood.
o In some cases, housing values increased at higher rate than the city or the region.
o Increased neighborhood assessed valuation in the one case where such data was
available.
o Privately sponsored new housing developed.

•

In the developments that made public school reform a part of the redevelopment,
Centennial Place in Atlanta and Murphy Park in St. Louis, elementary school test scores
show significant improvement over the first five years after reforms were put in place.

187

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

VOL. 1, NO. 1

Lessons Learned
Success, in my estimation, is when former public housing residents are seamlessly
integrated into the larger neighborhood, when people are not stigmatized by where they live and
where neighborhood economies are being recreated. Success is when former public housing
residents are provided with a broad array of quality services with which they can tailor a plan to
move to self-sufficiency and gainful employment. Success is when new partnerships emerge that
bind public housing authorities to the larger city government and bring new civic and
neighborhood stakeholders into the redevelopment process and ongoing life of the community.
With public housing as the impetus, neighborhoods throughout the country are being revitalized
into communities where people with choices are choosing to make their homes. In effect,
“opportunity areas” are being created on the former sites of some of the worst public housing.

Following are five basic principals 22 for using public housing revitalization as a catalyst for
large-scale neighborhood reinvestment:
1. Public housing redevelopment plans should be part of a larger
neighborhood vision developed and sustained with the active
involvement of a broad set of stakeholders.
2. Public housing redevelopments must focus on social mobility and
opportunity for affected public housing families.
3. Public housing redevelopments must consciously break the
psychological and physical barriers that separate its residents from the
mainstream.
22

Public housing redevelopments must include transparent relocation and right of return policies. Unfortunately,
relocation is not the subject of this paper.
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4. Public housing redevelopments must leverage additional public and
private dollars and, in doing so, engage a broader set of stakeholders
beyond public housing residents, their advocates and PHAs.
5. The public housing redevelopment must be rooted in market principals.

1. Public Housing redevelopment plans should be part of a larger
neighborhood vision developed and sustained with active involvement of a
broad set of stakeholders
In order for public housing redevelopments to transform the larger neighborhood, they
should be developed as part of a long-range comprehensive plan for the neighborhood. The
plans must look beyond the boarders of the public housing sites to engage and incorporate
the needs of the larger neighborhood. The significant investment of public and private funds
should flow beyond the once clearly demarcated property lines, blurring the division of
families by income, class and sometimes race.
Planning for the physical and social needs of a new mixed-income community, one that
will include a significant number of public housing families takes time. It is critical that a
community engagement process take place that includes, the existing public housing
residents, community residents, PHA staff, city staff and political leaders, social service
providers, local intuitions, local schools, park districts, the police, market analysts and the
developers and their architects. This is not typical neighborhood planning. It requires all of
these disparate parties to join together to create a new and shared vision for a piece of real
estate and a neighborhood that means different things to each of them.
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When done well, the planning process, with its typical multi-day planning charrette,
brings the stakeholders together around a vision of the possible. Difficult issues must be
resolved including: how many units will be on the site, how many will be in the surrounding
neighborhood, income mix, number of rental units, number of for-sale units, infrastructure,
schools, parks and commercial space, if applicable.
Generally, the people engaged in these planning meetings have never worked together
before and carry with them preconceived perceptions of each other. The process takes time
and must be built on trust. Each party has a contribution to make to the new vision of the
neighborhood. However, it is imperative the existing public housing residents be engaged.
According to HUD rules, residents must sign-off on the plan. They are the ones with the
most to lose and the most to gain. This would not be an easy process for anyone, let alone
some of the most dispossessed members of our society faced with loosing their homes.
An ongoing community stakeholder group or steering committee is also critical to the
success of public housing redevelopments. Invariably changes will have to be made to the
plan, based on financing, market and city funding. This stakeholder group should serve as an
advisory board to the development team, the city and the housing authority.
This type of planning is expensive, often costing as much as half a million dollars. Many
cash strapped housing authorities are reticent to expend this level of funding for only the
chance of winning a large federal grant. Unfortunately, without this level of engagement and
expense, many public housing redevelopment efforts fall short when it comes to
implementation.
Experience has taught us that without the investment in good quality planning and honest
civic dialogue, the public housing redevelopment often falls short, causing long-term
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consequences in the implementation stage. When HUD began the HOPE VI program, public
housing authorities could apply for $500,000 planning grants. Within a few years, HUD
dropped this program in a shortsighted attempt to save money. Cities, philanthropy and
housing authorities should find a way to fund this community engagement and planning
process.

2. Public housing redevelopments must focus on social mobility and opportunity for
affected public housing families.
It is easy to get caught up in the complexities of the physical planning, design, financing
and real estate transitions. However, the purpose of the HOPE VI program is to improve the
life opportunities for very low-income families that reside in public housing. Simply
providing attractive housing in a more secure environment is not enough. Assisting public
housing families to become self-sufficient and productive members of society is the clearly
stated goal of the program. Unfortunately, this purpose is sometimes overlooked.
Successfully integrating former public housing families into economically diverse living
environments requires focusing on the needs of the families who are affected by the
redevelopment. Just as comprehensive physical plans are developed, comprehensive social
service delivery plans must also be created. Often this requires reconfiguring the existing
panoply of social service programs into a comprehensive system that addresses the needs of
the families. Often, there is a mismatch between the needs of the existing families and the
services available to them. A serious assessment of the supportive service needs of affected
families should be undertaken to understand gaps in the existing delivery system, as well as
provide a level of accountability of the services provided.

191

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

VOL. 1, NO. 1

Unlike the early days of HOPE VI, most PHAs should not be the primary provider of
services. Nor should most private developers. Social service provision is not the core
capacity of these organizations. Instead, development teams should include people or
institutions with expertise in social service delivery that can make sense of the complex web
of service providers, and encourage new systems to meet the needs of the residents as well as
the ability to secure needed resources.
Very low-income public housing families often have a variety of issues holding them
back from full integration into the work force. These families need help to stabilize their
situations such as day care, after school programming, GED classes, substance abuse
programs, etc. In a successful redevelopment, a system of case management is instituted to
assist help families find the services they need before, during and after redevelopment.
When families are required to have employment, training, or education as a prerequisite
for returning to public housing, 23 access to these opportunities must be provided by those
engaged in the redevelopment. In a number of successful public housing redevelopments,
new stakeholders such as banks, universities and hospitals offer entry-level employment
opportunities.
The goals of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing and the
HOPE VI program identified the need to assist families to reach self-sufficiency as well as
the importance of bringing new collaborations and resources to public housing families.
Improving opportunities for social mobility must be a focus of these neighborhood
transformation activities.

23

These requirements have been instituted by PHAs, developers and sometimes the public housing resident
associations.
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3.. Public housing redevelopments must break the psychological and physical barriers
that separate its residents from the mainstream
Families that live in the “projects” are stigmatized and categorized simply by where they
live. Assumptions are made about residents of public housing by neighbors, schools, police
and others without even knowing them. Residents of public housing are somehow marked as
different because they live in housing that looks different than that in the rest of the
community.
Successful public housing redevelopments break these stereotypes wide open. They
seamlessly integrate families of differing income levels into the same development. The new
developments are designed to meet high quality standards and include features that attract
families who have other housing choices. High quality design and amenities should be
incorporated into the housing so it cannot be distinguished as low-income housing.
Superblocks that once isolated the community and created havens for criminal activity must
be broken up to a human scale. Streets are reintroduced into the developments that connect
back to the neighborhood. This reconfiguring of the neighborhood infrastructure requires
significant collaboration with the city and significant public investment. Where possible, the
developments should incorporate vacant tracts of land from the surrounding neighborhood,
thus lowering density and blurring the lines of the development.
Quality redevelopments include a range of incomes that include apartments for families
with other housing choices. Units are not identified and often float, meaning that a unit
occupied by a market-rate family one year could be leased to a public housing or tax credit
family the next year. Consequently, no one knows who is a public housing family or not.
The image of the development is of one that might be found in market-rate communities.
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The “projects” are gone. The stigma is gone. Yet, many of the same people who previously
lived in the “projects” now live in the new development.

4. Public housing redevelopments must leverage additional public and private financial
and civic capital.
With the changes to the public housing regulations that allowed for private ownership of
public housing and the full-scale demolition and rebuilding of new communities, a new set of
stakeholders emerged. For the first time in decades, mayors began to lobby HUD for public
housing funds. Beginning in 1995, mayors such as Tom Murphy of Pittsburgh and Jerry
Abramson of Louisville personally visited HUD Secretary Cisneros to make the case for why
their cities should be awarded HOPE VI funds. In every city my colleagues and I visited, the
mayor was present to make the case for their city to be awarded HOPE VI funds. Mayors are
among the strongest advocates for public housing funding. This has not been the case for
over thirty years.
Just as important as mayoral support, civic leaders from various cities began to rally
around receiving HOPE VI grants. A consortium of Atlanta business, political and civic
leaders hosted a presentation for my HUD colleagues and me to articulate why the Techwood
and Clark Howell Homes should be awarded HOPE VI funds. In Baltimore, the mayor, chief
of police and the president of the University of Maryland Medical School joined forces
exemplifying the level of public and private commitment they were prepared to make if
HOPE VI funding was made available for Baltimore’s Lexington Terrace redevelopment.
These commitments included additional state funding, employment training and entry-level
jobs at the University of Maryland hospitals. A delegation of civic leaders headed by the
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president of the Cleveland Foundation met with Secretary Cisneros to plead Cleveland’s case
for HOPE VI funding. These are just a few of the examples of the civic engagement that
emerged around cities receiving public housing funds. In Chicago, the MacArthur
Foundation is making a sizable commitment the CHA Plan for Transformation.
As the public housing development process changed to one that embraced public
private/partnerships, developers, lawyers and accountants, lenders joined in the public
housing development process, bringing new credibility and influence to the table.
At the local level, business leaders, major institutions, civic organizations and
foundations became engaged in the public housing redevelopment process. In St. Louis, over
twenty-five local corporations invested in the transformation of George L. Vaughn public
housing to mixed-income Murphy Park Homes. Those same investors became the driving
force behind a school reform effort in that community. In Pittsburgh, it was the Manchester
Citizens Council, the local CDC, that lobbied the City to help them realize their community
plan by redeveloping the public housing in their community.
These institutions and community stakeholders have joined with public housing residents
and PHAs to create new collaborations aimed at rebuilding former public housing
communities and providing new opportunities for the families who live in them. Cities, for
the first time in decades, committed significant sums of money for infrastructure and gap
financing. Local foundations and institutions provided funding for planning, and
reconfigurations of social service delivery systems.
In Atlanta and St. Louis, reconstituted elementary schools became the cornerstone of the
redevelopments, with funding and civic engagement from the corporate and civic leaders.
These schools have seen significant improvement in test scores for neighborhood children.
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In Atlanta, the Centennial Place School serves a low-income African American student body
and is now the second-highest performing elementary school in the Atlanta School District. 24
Were it not for the mixed-income nature of the development and the revitalizing impact it
was anticipated to have on the neighborhood, the new stakeholders necessary to build a new
school would not have been part of the redevelopment program.
In city after city, public housing redevelopment was raised to a level of civic dialogue.
With the hope that the concentrated poverty can be broken up, neighborhood revitalization is
possible and opportunities to create mixed-income communities, public housing, in many
communities, is on the civic agenda.
Had HOPE VI remained a traditional public housing rehabilitation program that isolated
families and did not contribute to the larger neighborhoods while continuing to concentrate
poverty, this type of civic and political engagement around public housing would not have
occurred. It certainly did not happen in the early days of the program.

5. The public housing redevelopment must be rooted in market principals.
HUD’s original intent in creating the mixed-finance, mixed-income approach to public
housing redevelopment was not simply to socially engineer the redevelopments. We wanted
to create a mechanism that would protect public housing for low-income families while also
making it subject to market forces. We wanted to inject market discipline into the
development process by subjecting the developments to real market risk which demanded
that private owners and investors maintain a quality environment. Most importantly, we
wanted to assure HUD’s investment was sustained over time, thereby providing quality

24

Egbert Perry, supra note 8.
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housing over the long run. By integrating other sources of funds (including tax credit equity,
first mortgage debt and other debt), there would be an entirely new set of institutional eyes
on the deal, evaluating its viability and requiring returns. Private financing assured that a
system of checks and balances was imposed on the development and operations of the
property. This was a system that HUD and PHAs were not capable of creating through
traditional public housing development mechanisms.
When a market-rate rental component is integrated into the financing of the development,
the owner has real risk in the form of real debt on the property that must be repaid.
Developers and owners also risk that families with other housing options will not choose to
live in the development. Consequently, the property must be built to a market-rate standard.
Furthermore, it must be managed and maintained to a market-rate standard. If families with
choices leave, the financing of the development will unravel and there will be serious
consequences for the owners, lenders and investors.
Establishing these market and financial checks and balances – with real risks for the
owner – assures that the development, including the public housing and tax credit units, will
be sustainable. When the market-rate component of a development is separated from the
direct operations and financing of the public housing units, these assurances are lost. Also of
critical importance, when there is a market-rate rental component, the development cannot be
stigmatized as a low-income development because it is not. It is a market-rate development
with public housing. 25
The most successful public housing redevelopments – those that not only create quality
housing for low-income families but also transform the larger neighborhood – include a
25

Interview with Renee Glover, CEO Atlanta Housing Authority (Mar. 21, 2003).
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market-rate or unrestricted rental component. In these developments, there are public
housing units and tax credit units, each serving families under 60% of median area income.
However, the subsidy is tied to the housing. People with limited income and little housing
choice, must remain at the development to maintain below market or subsidized rent. The
history of public housing and project-based Section 8 has shown that, even as management
and the physical conditions of the development declines, low-income renters remain in the
unit because they have no other housing options. With a captive market, there are few
incentives for the owners to continue to improve the quality of the living environment. The
market incentives are simply not in place to demand quality over time.
Nearly all of the earliest public housing redevelopments included some form of a marketrate or unrestricted rental component, including all the Atlanta Housing Authority
redevelopments (as it is policy), Murphy Park in St. Louis and Park Du Valle in Louisville.
Over time, many cities have opted to separate the market-rate component, segregating it as
homeownership, while the rental component is strictly low-income. In these cases, there is a
clear demarcation by income that one type of housing is low-income, i.e. the rental and the
for-sale is market rate for higher income families. Once again, residents are identified and
stigmatized by the homes in which they live. Most importantly, the carefully crafted checks
and balances that protect the living environment for low-income families are erased.

Conclusion
The institution of public housing is forever changed. Over the past decade public
housing has taken a radical departure, from causing neighborhood decline to reversing it.
Bureaucracies that functioned outside the mainstream of their cities are now part of the

198

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

VOL. 1, NO. 1

solution. New developments have radically changed the urban landscape and rebuilt
neighborhood economies. Families that lived in dangerous and deteriorating public housing
are now living high quality modern apartments, next to families of various incomes and
walks of life. Many of the families in this process have broken out of their isolated poverty
and are attaining a level of social mobility.
Nearly all of this realignment is the result of enabling public housing to be built in
partnership with private developers, creating economically integrated communities. With a
vision of new possibilities, entirely new relationships, stakeholders and resources have
focused attention on the needs of the lowest income families in our cities. Mayors across the
country are focusing local resources on public housing developments and the families that
reside within them. New civic and philanthropic stakeholders are engaged in the public
housing issue.
When looking back at the goals of the National Commission on Severely Distressed
Public Housing, it is clear that the problems they articulated are being remedied and the
vision they set forth is becoming a reality in a number of cities. HUD’s 1995 goals –
creating communities of choice, leveraging new resources, establishing collaborations and
innovative partnerships and establishing innovative approaches to funding delivery of
supportive services – have been realized in many redevelopments.
When HUD embarked on this journey of changing the way public housing was
developed, we were unsure of the outcome, but we believed there had to be a better way to
expand for low-income people and it that it was worth trying. At that time, there was talk in
Congress of eliminating the public housing program altogether. A series of reforms were
enacted in response to that possibility. The slogan at HUD became “ending public housing

199

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

VOL. 1, NO. 1

as we know it.” For those who worked to change the system, inside and outside of HUD,
public and private, our mantra was “saving public housing as we don’t know it.” I think we
succeeded.
Today, while HOPE VI is still under siege, Senators, members of Congress, big city
mayors, philanthropic and civic leaders have rallied around clearly demonstrated public
housing successes. On the sites of failed public housing, new economically integrated
communities are being rebuilt with long term affordable housing. Neighborhood economies
are being rebuilt with private investment and newfound community confidence. Low-income
families are working hard at self-sufficiency and, in many cases, have attained high school
diplomas, graduated from college or are fully employed. Many of the children that resided in
the dangerous and decrepit public housing have significantly greater opportunities to
succeed.
These public housing successes, and the new constituencies they have brought to public
housing, have helped fend off the constant attack on public housing and the low-income
families it was intended to serve.
Is the program perfect? By no means, there are plenty of HOPE VI redevelopments that
do not fully meet the original goals of the program. Many do not transform the surrounding
neighborhood. Unfortunately, there are a number of developments where the interests of the
residents were lost in the process. It is important to admit the failings and attempt to redress
them.
Yet for those redevelopments that have succeeded, the results are remarkably similar to
the outcomes Gautreaux has sought: social mobility, economic integration and, on rare
occasion, racial integration. In a sense, the successful public housing redevelopments are
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creating “opportunity areas” right back on the site of failed public housing. These on-site
“opportunity areas” create the choice for low-income African American families to stay in
their neighborhood and reap the benefits of new collaborations and new investment.
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